

The Absence of an Expert Opinion in the Ambash Case and the Problem of the Victims' Rights

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“Dishonest scales are an abomination to the Lord,
But accurate weights find favor with Him”
Proverbs 11:1

ABSTRACT: The article analyzes the notion of victim first of all in its historical context, Greek, Jewish, Christian, and modern. It then addresses the issue of victims' rights acknowledged by international conventions. Applying its principles to the Ambash women's case, it concludes that qualifying them as “victims” is based on a dysfunction of justice.

KEYWORDS: Daniel Ambash, Ambash Case, Victims, Victimology, Victimization.

Introductory Remarks

This brief article aims to analyze the notion of victim, in one of the most problematic legal contexts. In 2008, Daniel Ambash was arrested and sentenced to 26 years' imprisonment after a trial in which he was convicted of eighteen charges. It is not our purpose to analyze the terms of the judgment; however, in order to assess the severity of the verdict, it is necessary to recall that the decision of the judges was based on the fact that the accused had in the first place been found guilty of “enslavement” of the members of his family (Sarfati 2015a).

Two remarks are necessary, before getting into the heart of the subject. First of all, the notion of “enslavement,” in this case, is combined with the hypothesis of “mental submission” (the judges attribute telepathic powers to the accused when

they speak of mental influence); this hypothesis has no validity in any part of the world where modern jurisdictions prevail, based on procedure and material evidence (Anthony and Introvigne 2006). In this case, the verdict is an axiomatic system; all other counts are extrapolated or derived from this main charge. On the other hand, the judges defined Daniel Ambash's companions as his victims. However, his four companions refuse *this qualification that they did not demand*, and fight since the beginning of his imprisonment for the revision and the acquittal of their life companion.

The Ambash case is not a trivial criminal case, since the defendant was presented as the leader of a sadistic sect, characterized by the regular practice of rape, and the abuse inflicted on both the defendant's companions and their many children. The fact that this family was formed on the fringes of the accepted norms (de facto polygamy, education of children at home) tends to blur the representations: the moral judgment, in this case, has clearly outweighed the reasonable and rigorous assessment of the facts.

The judicial situation that has prevailed since 2008 in the treatment of this case, which makes headlines, with notable variations in the media influencing the public opinion, involves many difficulties. The most notable, that remains the object of perplexity and interrogation, concerns the unilateral classification of persons who are identified as victims, without this assertion being—according to the rule in a criminal case—justified in the least, neither by the alleged victims (who are not plaintiffs, and do not constitute a civil party), nor by any legally mandatory expert opinion, at any level whatsoever (judges and/or lawyers). Finally, during the trial, no defense witness was heard, only witnesses for the prosecution.

The Idea of Victim in Western Civilization

The understanding of the notion of victim has evolved greatly throughout history, from Greek antiquity to its conceptualization in modern jurisdictions. This history is, so to speak, identical with that of the great civilization benchmarks, as well as with their internal changes. Gérard Lopez (Lopez 2010) recalls that the reassessment of the notion of victim is the result of three “epistemological breaks,” which benefited from the emergence of contemporary

understanding, from three fields: the socio-cultural and scientific field, the philosophical field, and the legal field.

Two paradigms of victimhood coexisted in ancient times: the Greek model, and the Biblical model. In the 5th century BCE, in Athens, the center of power moved from the Acropolis to the Agora. This considerable event, which founded democracy, took place due to the growing influence of the Sophists (de Romilly 2004). However, this significant transformation of the political exercise, as well as that of the conception of justice (*dhikè*), were based on the idea of an order of things being ruled according to a relationship of macro/micro-cosmic analogy, based on a cyclical conception of time, resistant to the idea of progress (Vernant 1965).

Breaking the standards of justice is a violation of the cosmic order, which calls for a punishment proportional to the seriousness of the fault. In this context, the penalty takes on the meaning of an atoning sacrifice, of which the victim is the real culprit as well as any member of his family clan. In other words—and this is a distinctive feature of pagan civilizations—sovereign power presupposes the notion of *collective responsibility*. Justice commands sacrifice, and the designated victim is forced to acknowledge his guilt. His death alone will allow the restoration of the cosmic harmony that his crime had disturbed. This is the meaning of Iphigenia's sacrifice ("Sacrifice me, overthrow Troy!" makes her say Euripides [around 480-406 BCE]).

The recognition of the individual character of the sin appeared after the battle of the Arginuses (406 BCE), with the ten strategists' trial, who, although victorious, were sentenced to death because they had given up collecting the deaths during a storm. This is when the change of consideration of the victimary process took place, as the Greeks regretted their execution of their own general staff.

Competitive to the sacrificial paradigm of the expiatory type, which has long prevailed in Greece, the Hebrew universe attests to a much older evolution, to which testifies in Judaism and in Christianity the problematic of the victimary process. As the Biblical account of patriarch Abraham's life tells us, the sacrifice that God commanded him to practice on his only son Isaac ended up with the substitution of an animal, assigned by an angel at the place of the immolation (*Genesis* 22:1–14). This account remains emblematic of the point of mutation

which, under the influence of nascent monotheism, the Hebrews had reached, putting an end to the very principle of human sacrifice.

But in the Biblical tradition, the persecution of the prophets, often forced to flee or to seek refuge to escape the wrath of a king or a crowd (Elijah, Jeremiah, to name but two examples) indicates that the sacrificial recourse for the purpose of restoring a theological-political order culminated with the death of Jesus, whose teaching stresses the need to break out of the fascinating circle of violence (Girard 1982; Balmary 1986; Lopez 2002). The Hebrew theme of the scapegoat finds no doubt in the condemnation of the Son of Man one of its culminating points, in the form of a refusal expressed in an exemplary manner by the victim himself, unlike the Greek framework of thought where the victim recognized the necessity of his own sacrifice, as an uncontrollable ritual, whose understanding was intimately linked to a cyclical conception of cosmic and human time.

On the philosophical level, the emergence of monotheism, its confrontation with the ethical norms of Greek thought, as a result of centuries of controversy, as evidenced by the history of Western scholasticism (Tresmontant 1964), the Jewish resistance to paganism (in practice as much as on a spiritual level), the doctrinal and temporal hegemony (through the monarchies of divine right, until the French Revolution of 1789), defeated the Greek cosmology, by diffusing in the mentalities the innovative conception of a linear time, if not a vector of moral progress (Tresmontant 2017). This factor contributed decisively, as much as the monotheistic personalism, to the renewal of the understanding of the notion of victim.

Beyond medieval maturation, the development of experimental rationalism at the time of the Renaissance was also a decisive factor in changing mentalities. The rise of analytic thought definitely defeated the analogical frame of reference (Foucault 1966). Correlatively, the formation of the philosophy of the subject— at the end of a long journey that starts from Augustin (354–430) to René Descartes (1596–1650), through Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592)— establishes the idea of the *cogito*, that is to say an autonomy and a personal exercise of thought, which makes man a responsible subject, with a free will and an effective understanding. As we know, it was the Enlightenment philosophy, perceived in its doctrinal diversity (Cassirer 1996), that relayed, on a collective level, notably through the *Encyclopaedia*, the new conceptions of the world, of

humanity and of progress, even if this revolution coincided globally with a systematic secularization of the theology of salvation (Löwith 2002).

On the legal side, the main mutations reported at the moment will be translated at a large scale, under the pen of Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794), an Italian jurist who endorsed the humanistic ideals of the Enlightenment. In his pioneering treaty *Dei delitti e delle pene* (Offenses and Penalties, 1764), the author opens the field of modern criminal jurisdiction, advocating important proposals in matters of investigation and procedure. These proposals will serve as a basis for the criminal justice of democratic states. Beccaria defends the principle of written criminal laws, pleads for the constitution of an accusatory procedure—which prevents from applying the simple good will of the Prince—and advocates the abolition of torture (extortion of confessions), but also of the penalty of death. He also introduces the definition of intangible and rational punishments—thus preventing the arbitrariness of power—as well as preventive measures to fight against crime. Beccaria’s innovative ideas will inspire major procedural reforms in criminal law, and will, at least in most democratic states, have important consequences, putting an end to the cruelty that characterized the courts of the Ancien Régime (Foucault 1975).

From the beginning of the 20th century on, psychoanalysis sheds new light on the human *psyche*, since Freud’s metapsychology emphasizes the importance of the unconscious, which renews the understanding and the very conception of subjectivity. The rise of modern linguistics, resulting from the work of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), equally overturns the classical conceptions of the individual, dispelling the illusion that he is the exclusive source of his enunciation. The two models come together, thus laying the foundations of the structuralist perspective (Lévi-Strauss 2003), anxious to emphasize the existence of logical formations that escape the consciousness of individuals-subjects. This renewal of the social sciences opens new perspectives to criminology and victimology. From now on, it will be necessary to agree with the irrefutable observation that the subjects most often obey, in their defending body, many determinisms capable of explaining part of their behavior. There is a psychology of the criminal, like a psychology of the “target victim,” so that to the notion of “subject of law” will be added that, critical, of “subject of the speech.”

At the end of the 20th century, Western civilization, which seems to have come back from totalitarian experiences, elaborates, in the context of post-modernity

(Lyotard 1979), a humanism of individualistic orientation, at the center of which the theme of human rights occupies a core place. Through this new mutation, the ethical concern becomes more constant, and tends to invade all social practices: the philosophy of “care” collides with an increasing sensitivity to the fragility of human beings. The hedonistic affirmation of the meaning of life goes hand in hand with a “deification of man” (Ferry 1996). Victimization is akin to the expression of this ethical concern, and the victim tends to become a “founding value” of civilization, as observed by René Girard (1923–2015). These developments are in line with a significant affirmation of humanitarian values (Sarfati 2015b).

The Fundamental Rights of Victims in Modern Legislations

Most often mirroring the major changes, previously restated in broad strokes, victimology took note of this cultural proliferation, integrated its contributions, while contributing to the evolution of the law, so that at the beginning of the 21st century this social science, itself heterogeneous as to its sources, is combined with legislations that guarantee the rights of victims (Cario 2001).

— Being a Victim is a Legal Status

The common use of the notion of victim—associated with the expression of a complaint unrelated to the effect of a serious prejudice (“I was a victim of a metro delay”), or in an entirely ideological way (“the victims of duty”), or any subjective way to speak (“he is a victim of himself alone”)—must not be confused with the legal concept coined from the same notion, to encompass under a legal category all the subjects who, at a given moment in their history, suffered a prejudice that could be recognized by the State and accepted by a court of justice (appellate, criminal, etc.).

The concept of victim presupposes a long history of the field of victimology (Cario 2001; Lopez 2010), based on the following definition: “A victim is an individual who has suffered harm recognized by a law, a text, or a regulation” (Lopez 2010, 5).

—The Fundamental Rights of the Victim

The definition we just recalled has as an objective correlative, a set of legal provisions, which is ratified by international conventions (Cario 2001, vol. 2), subjected to a consensus between the signatory states. These same provisions intend to characterize all the fundamental rights that distinguish the *victim status* under the law.

In the same vein, the signatory States undertake, by adopting the international conventions relative to the rights of victims, to enforce these rights, to enable the persons concerned to assert them, so that they may sue to obtain compensation for the suffered damage or injury. International jurisdiction in the area of victims' rights is combined with three main statements: Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Resolution 217 A [III], adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, 10/12/1948), providing for the right to access to justice; the declaration of 21/12/1965 on the elimination of crimes related to racial discrimination; and United Nations resolution 40/34 of 11/12/1985 on crime and abuse of power.

—Meaning, Legal and Practical Scope of the Rights of the Victim

A careful examination of the legal arsenal that decides on the status of victim makes it possible to reveal nine main provisions, which in principle have the force of law. Here is the inventory: (1) The right to access justice to plead one's case, (2) The right to be informed, (3) The right to be assisted and/or accompanied, (4) The right to compel the State to investigate effectively, (5) The right to a fair trial, (6) The right to be compensated, (7) The right to be protected, (8) The right to be taken care of, and finally (9) The right to be treated with competence.

Let's have a look at and define each of these rights more precisely (following Lopez 2010, chap. 4):

(1) *The right to access justice*: This is the first right granted to the victim, since practically it is from this principle that the following ones are deduced. From this first principle results that someone can be confirmed in the status of victim. This means that the legislator must facilitate this prior recourse. By virtue of this prerequisite, a victim must be able to freely apply to the courts, by seizing the immediately competent authority (police station, judicial authorities, etc.). This

first right also implies that the victim must be assisted for all expenses incurred as legal costs (attorney's fees, legal fees, bail).

(2) *The right to be informed*: This equally primordial provision depends on the State situations, as it is true that the lack of a legal culture of the citizen can be in sharp contrast with the complexities of the law, but this information must be guaranteed (town hall, police station, organizations or associations specialized in the defense of victims).

(3) *The right to be assisted and/or accompanied*: The assistance in question is that of a legal adviser, who allows the victim to sue, even if her personal financial means do not allow to do so. It is thus a complete legal aid (*supra*, 1), *a fortiori* when dealing with a minor. Below the legal age, any minor, victim of damage or injury, especially if the legal representatives are lacking (parents, family, guardians), must be accompanied specifically.

(4) *The right to compel the State to investigate effectively*: This right implies the possibility for the victim to be allowed to provide evidence; moreover, and this is consistent if the impartial application of the law is pursued, the same right implies that the evidence provided by the victim is taken into consideration by the judge(s). This fundamental right means that the victim is a full participant of the trial that concerns her. In many modern jurisdictions, the procedure remains the prerogative of the judges, because of the great inquisitorial power of the judiciary, which constitutes a legacy of the jurisdictions of the Ancien Régime.

(5) *The right to a fair trial*: This provision takes into account the inevitable dialectic that develops between the victim and the accused, that is to say between the victim and her alleged offender (accused, but not guilty until the verdict is rendered). In the modern jurisdictions, the presumption of innocence must in principle guarantee this nuance; in practice, the outbid of the media tends to shatter the presumption of innocence. That is what happened at once in the Ambash trial. This right must allow the victim to support her cause, to come and plead in support of the expert actors. It is a principle of equity that, if respected, must be reflected in at least two ways: by guaranteeing the rights of the defense, while also guaranteeing the right to the expression of the victim in the course of an open debate against the accused;

(6) *The right to compensation*: This right is guaranteed by the State, it is enforceable as soon as the concerned individual has received the legal status of victim (*supra*, 1).

(7) *The right to be protected*: It is known that the victim is constantly exposed to acts of retaliation, which her aggressor, even imprisoned, can exercise through various means of blackmail, threats, or intimidation. All these maneuvers can directly concern the victim, or weigh on his relatives and/or his entourage. By deciding to go to Court for compensation, the victim is exposed to new dangers. The victim must therefore be protected by the State against the perpetrator of the offenses, throughout the whole duration of the repair proceedings;

(8) *The right to be taken in charge*: This provision constitutes a significant innovation of the modern courts, since it concerns, beyond the compensatory allowances (*supra*, 6), a set of complementary and indispensable procedures, which contribute to the repair of the damage or the harm suffered psychological, but also medical, care. The right to be taken care of is an essential part of the victims' rights, since it defines the concrete plan of the expertise, through the technical and clinical references of the listening and the care. The *competent expertise*—of the psychologist and the psychiatrist—as well as of physicians (in cases of physical aggression, most often causing serious psychological trauma and/or physical injury) has become in modern jurisdictions a *fundamental moment of instruction and conduct of the trial* (Lopez, Portelli and Clement 2007). *This means that the attribution, the granting and the recognition of the victim status is inextricably linked to the work of the experts*. Any attempt to contravene what is now a prerequisite constitutes a major denial of rights, and leaves considerable room for arbitrariness.

(9) *The right to be treated with competence*: This last provision is deduced from the previous ones, removing any possible ambiguity. In short, this right recapitulates and synthesizes the precedents. It is a matter of reaffirming the need to provide the victim with all the assistance that she may need, both in terms of services (counseling, assistance, information, protection, expertise, etc.) and of care, for the sole purpose of avoiding revictimization of the victims.

The “Victims” of the Ambash Affair

The quality of “victims” was attributed to the women and children who constituted the extended family of Daniel Ambash, before his arrest in 2008. An independent counter-investigation (Sarfati 2015a) established that the women are not victims of Daniel Ambash, and that the mistreatment of the children in this family is mainly the work of a former partner of the convicted person, who benefited from the status of “witness turning state’s evidence” (primarily for the prosecution) and who, through this status, enjoys to this day a complete criminal immunity.

It should be added that, following specific procedures, minor children have been placed in specialized institutions. In 2017, escaping from the center where she had been sent to by Court order, one of the girls of the group was found unconscious with her spine broken, raped with bruises and burns of cigarettes left on her body. No investigation was conducted, and the social services, which are legally responsible for the population of young minors placed in their centers, did not have to report on this situation. The teenage girl died in the spring of 2018, following several surgeries. The father, detained in prison, was not allowed to be present at the burial of his daughter, and senior representatives of the social services were sent to the Jerusalem cemetery to prevent the mother of the child, and the few others present, to approach the burial place.

Another child, only thirteen years old in 2008, was manipulated by the prosecution to bring the most severe charges against his father. He then publicly retracted his testimony, in an open letter to the judges and the prosecutor. He had been interned by court order, subjected to unjustified psychiatric treatment. The combination of trauma caused by the attitude of the police, the context of the trial, and the mistreatment committed against him by the social services have weakened him for a long time. This boy, today major, is followed for schizophrenic disorders: the suffering and the feeling of guilt had their destructive effect.

An Automatic Attribution

Let us recall the facts and logically consider what results from them.

In the context of the investigation, the Jerusalem Court granted the status of victims to D. Ambash's companions. But in this specific context, the Court's decision was accompanied by two related decisions, since it is *a special statute*:

a – Prohibition of taking legal action because they are “victims of Daniel Ambash.”

b – Prohibition to assert any right as *designated victims*.

Note that in their case, the judiciary has overridden all stages of clinical, psychological and medical expertise:

a – The companions of D. Ambash were not heard as victims.

b – The companions of D. Ambash were not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric examination.

c – The companions of D. Ambash have also not been subjected to any forensic examination which would be necessary in such a situation.

In other words, in the Ambash case, in a completely derogatory manner, *the judges replaced the experts*. Leaving their field of attribution, they arrogated to themselves skills of expertise that are not theirs: psychological expertise, forensic expertise. As regards the definition and the attribution of the legal statute of victim, the judges involved in the Ambash affair have used a discretionary power: they did not order the required expert opinion in criminal matters, on the one hand in order to validate the status of the victims, on the other hand to justify that this status was properly granted. Let us remind, indeed, that the results of an expert opinion constitute evidence in the investigation of a criminal case, at least within States with modern jurisdictions, and that are signatories of major international conventions on law and protection of victims.

The author of this text, who is also the editor of the counter-investigation, has met several times with Ambash's companions. As a psychotraumatologist, he can say that these persons have no primary or secondary symptoms of severe psychic trauma. Whereas in the case of trauma, the symptomatic manifestation persists, in the absence of care, causing serious personality disorders (as is the case regarding some children detained in institutions of the social welfare). But the “victims” of D. Ambash present perfectly balanced, combative personalities, eager to recover their speech and their civic and existential integrity.

It is important to recall the following facts:

a – The companions of D. Ambash are not complainants, they have never been a civil party, they have always refused to do so.

b – The companions of D. Ambash claim that they are not victims of D. Ambash, they have remained united and leagued since the beginning of his trial and of his imprisonment, to defend their friend, multiplying initiatives, press campaigns, working with supporters and lawyers to obtain a review of the trial, and demand the acquittal and release of the convicted person.

c – Nevertheless, by virtue of their status as designated victims, they are deprived of all their rights as alleged victims.

A question arises: do the judges of Jerusalem know better than the people concerned, here the companions of D. Ambash, if they are victims? By virtue of which judicial or extra-judicial jurisdiction have they decided to adopt a series of derogations? Why did the Israeli judges, in charge of the Ambash case, attribute to Ambash's companions a victim status that they never claimed, and that they refuse to endorse? The designated victims may be carriers of *elements of truth in this case*, which are likely to undermine the substance of the very logic of the investigation, implying the authority of all bodies involved: the police and the investigators, the social services, the judiciary. Why otherwise *irrevocably invalidate* the statement of the victims?

The State Victimization

The above development has shown that, in the light of international jurisdiction over victims' rights, the Jerusalem Court has adopted a paradoxical and arbitrary decision. Paradoxical, because the granting of the victim status makes the individuals in question victims designated but not acknowledged as such; even more paradoxical, because a special status, a derogatory status, is used to gag the alleged victims and systematically deny their rights. Arbitrary finally, since the attribution of the victim status was made in spite of any expertise proceeding, likely to bring tangible evidence. This indicates that, strictly speaking, if the legal expert opinion had been mandated, it is very likely that it would have invalidated the judges' assessment: *Daniel Ambash's companions are not victims of Daniel Ambash, they are victims of the justice of their country, that is to say, Israeli citizens who are victims of the State of Israel.*

The following table explains how each of the nine fundamental rights of victims has been and continues to be violated:

| International legal provision for the protection of victims | Treatment of victims designated by the Jerusalem Court in the case of Ambash |
|--|--|
| Right to access justice | The special/derogatory status on principle prohibits them the exercise of this right. |
| Right to information | The only information is the one provided by the representative body of the FECRIS-MIVILUDES anti-cult federation in Israel. |
| Right to assistance and support | The designated victims fully assume the costs of the proceedings... to establish that their partner is not a criminal (enslaver, sadistic cult leader, rapist, etc.) |
| Right to compel the State to investigate efficiently | The inquisitorial nature of the judiciary allows judges to neglect or refuse to conduct an effective investigation. |
| Right to a fair trial | The convicted person was denied a fair trial; the rights of the defense were not respected. The judges did not ask for any expert opinions, neither on him nor on his “victims.” The results of this expert opinion could be a decisive element in favor of the Ambash family. |
| Right to compensation | The judiciary broke the Ambash family and drove it to ruin. To pay the legal fees, the convicted person’s “victims” have sold their homes and belongings, and to this day live in a situation of constant precariousness. |
| Right to protection | The “victims” have not been protected; they have been troubled and persecuted by the State, since they wanted to assert their version of the facts. Like the women, the children of the Ambash family were subjected to a sequel of continuous violence aimed at obtaining statements that can be used against the convicted person. |
| Right to being taken care of | The “victims” of D. Ambash were initially imprisoned. They were beaten and abused, deprived of their children, harassed by social services. No expert opinion was provided, which would have allowed them to prove that they are no “victims.” |
| Right to be treated with competence | The judges have arrogated to themselves the |

| | |
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| | main competences, abolishing the possibility of treating the Ambash case in accordance with the rights of the defense and the rights of the victims. |
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Conclusion: The Return of the Scapegoat

A society under high belligerous tension, that is to say a society accustomed to a certain threshold of collective violence, in a climate of siege mentality, most often encouraged by the security ideology, particularly related to the terrorist threat—would this lead to a tendency to harden the provisions of its criminal jurisdiction, or even to allow a not inconsiderable part of arbitration infiltrate its canonical procedures? The question arises, and the horizon it suggests is perhaps one of the elements that have to be addressed in considering the incomprehensible management of the Ambash Affair, since we have become aware of it.

If this hypothesis has any validity, it would mean that we would be obliged, in this societal context, to differentiate between two categories of victims: the victims who receive their full justification by national interest (*raison d'état*), therefore the worthy victims, and the shameful victims, victims without justification, indefensible and unjustifiable, appointed by the same national interest, to restore to civil society the sacrificial part of which modernity has deprived it. In this case, the justified victims would be those of war and terrorism, as the polemology has shown (Bouthoul 1997), while the unjustifiable victims would be those, too closely involved in a criminal case, whose symbolic integrity, honor and fundamental rights are being flouted by the State who was supposed to protect them.

This judicial dualism—a caricature of the “double standard” adage—contrasts two conceptions, and indeed two victim politics, whose contradictory representation can be seen in the following schema:

| | |
|--|---|
| National interest (<i>raison d'état</i>) | Judiciary and Criminal Cases |
| Recognized victims | Designated victims |
| Justified victims – victims of war: tribute of the Nation – victims of terrorism: being taken care of | Unjustifiable victims – compromised in a criminal case – suspected |
| Positive Process of Restorative Justice | Discriminatory process of an eviction justice |

| | |
|--|---|
| Symbolic and/or practical reintegration of victims | Over-victimization / scapegoat strategy |
|--|---|

By a completely unexpected bias, Israel, whose collective memory remains forever burdened by the trauma of the Nazi genocide (Epstein 2005), would, through the perceptible dysfunctions of its repressive judicial system, contribute to the introduction of traumatogenic mechanisms, typical of any aggressor system (Sarfati 2015a).

But also, by a singular effect of system, we would attend the discrete return of the purifying ritual of the “scapegoat.” Indeed, the unusual treatment of the four companions of Daniel Ambash seems in our opinion to accredit this hypothesis, so much the unintelligible conduct of the Israeli judiciary appears in this case tainted with irrational motives.

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Note: For several books originally published in English, the French translation consulted by the author has been indicated rather than the English original.

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